EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION OF RESIDENT
ALIENS: THE RE-ENTRY DOCTRINE
AND THE NEED FOR REFORM

INTRODUCTION

Exclusion and deportation statutes have long applied to immigrants and resident aliens.' The exclusion or deportation of aliens
is often based on an "entry" made by crossing the border into the

United States.2 This "entry" may be the original arrival in this
country by an immigrant or any subsequent re-entry by a resident
alien.3 When "entry" is found, immigrants and resident aliens alike
become subject to some of the exclusion and deportation provisions.
As a result, an alien who has resided in this country for a substantial period of time may be treated the same as an immigrant who
has never come into the United States. Thus, the question of
"entry" may be critical to a resident alien who is being excluded
or deported.
The concept of "entry" was originally a judicial doctrine 4 which
was subsequently codified. 5 The statutory definition of "entry"
excepted entries which were not "intended." In Rosenberg v.
Fleuti,8 the United States Supreme Court, under the guise of statutory construction, ascribed an unexpected meaning to the "intent"
exception. Fleuti did more than interpret the statutory definition
1. See Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914).
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212, 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182,
1251 (1970).
3. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933). This
is because the relevant statutes apply to all persons who are not citizens
or nationals thereby including resident aliens, who do not fall into either
category. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a) (3) (1970).
4. While Congress had written the "entry" requirement into the exclusion and deportation statutes, the courts originally had decided that a reentry was the same as the original "entry" for the purposes of these
statutes. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425
(1933), and Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 322 U.S. 388 (1947).
5. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)
(13) (1970).
6. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
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of "entry"; it created substantive immigration law independent of
the statutory framework. Lower federal courts and the Board of
Immigration Appeals have had great difficulty interpreting FZeuti
because the opinion used confusing language. Recently, the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits have dealt with the FIeuti standard.7 These
decisions create a split in the circuits and demonstrate the critical
need for definitive standards in this area of immigration law.
Before addressing the need for clarification of the re-entry doctrine, it is necessary to explore the substantive effects of "entry,"
and to examine how the early decisions interpreted the "entry" requirement.
DEIuNG

THE

CONSEQUENCES OF ENTRY

Necessary to a discussion of the re-entry doctrine under Fleuti
is an understanding of the substantive and procedural consequences
of "entry." The exclusion and deportation statutes are harsh and
a misinterpretation of the re-entry doctrine, which triggers some of
these statutes, is not merely an academic error. For example,
because of a recent Ninth Circuit interpretation of Fleuti, the
8
defendant was deported to Bulgaria.
Any non-citizen can be excluded from the United States at the
border if he does not meet the rigorous immigration standards.
Since the immigration laws apply to re-entering resident aliens, the
exclusion statute can prevent a resident alien from returning to
the United States even though he could not have been deported
if he had not left the country. The exclusion statute can be used
against a resident alien who was healthy when first admitted to
the United States, and who subsequently becomes "insane,"
"mentally retarded," or develops a "psychopathic personality."
This alien is not deportable but could be excluded from the
United States following a later "entry" into this country. 9 The
result would be the same for a "chronic alcoholic," a "polyga7. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974); Palatian v. INS,
502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).

8. Palatian v.INS,502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).

9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (1), (2), (4), 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a) (1), (2), (4) (1970).

This assumes that the alien is not a "public

charge" or "institutionalized at public expense."

§ 1251 (a) (8).

Id. § 241 (a)(8), 8 U.S.C.

mist," or a person "likely at any time to become a public charge."'"
An alien who was exempted from military service could not be deported, but could be excluded on re-entry. 11
Two exclusion provisions deal with the alien's past conduct which
could not have been grounds for his deportation. 12 The first is
the exclusion of "[a]liens who have had one or more attacks of
insanity."' 3 Suppose that a resident alien suffered an attack of
insanity after his original entry. This alien could be excluded on
re-entry even if he was totally cured and thus was not deport14
able.
The second exclusionary provision which covers the alien's past
conduct has a broader reach. It provides for the exclusion of
[a]liens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude... or aliens who admit having committed such a crime, or

aliens who admit committing acts which constitute the essential
elements of such a crime ....

I

Without leaving the country a resident alien might not have been
deportable because there was no conviction, or because the crime
occurred five years after his original entry. Because the moral turpitude section reaches back to cover all past crimes, a re-entering
resident alien could be excluded for a crime which would not make
him deportable.
The deportation statute authorizes the expulsion of an alien who
was excludable at the time of "entry."' 6 The substantive effect
is that "entry" expands the scope of the deportation statute, and
since there is no statute of limitations, there can be a much delayed
deportation. Since "entry" includes re-entry, a resident alien who
made a short trip over the border in the distant past and was then
subject to exclusion could be deported years later even though the
condition which made him subject to exclusion is gone.
Deportation can only be imposed for certain acts that occur
within five years of "entry,"l17 but a final, significant substantive
10. Id. § 241(a) (5), (11), (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (5), (11), (15).
11. Id. § 241(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(22).
RosENIL,

IMnMGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE

See 1 C.

GORDON

& H.

§ 2.49(b) (rev. ed. 1975).

12. Some other provisions deal with past conduct which can be a ground
for deportation without an "entry." See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(a) (25), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (25) (1970).
13. Id. § 212(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
14. 1 GoRDoN, supra note 11, § 2.38(b) (1).

15. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9)
(1970).
16. Id. § 241(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1).
17. Id. § 241(a) (3), (4), (8), (13), (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (3), (4), (8),

(13), (15).
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effect of "entry" is that a re-entry triggers the five-year period regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States. Thus,
a resident alien who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and sentenced to the penitentiary for a year or more within
five years after any re-entry could be deported' s even though he
had lived here longer than five years after the original entry.
Besides the substantive effects of "entry," it can have important
procedural consequences. An alien subject to deportation may be
subject to exclusionary proceedings because of re-entry. Deportation proceedings are harsh, but at least the burden of proof is on
20
the government 9 and the alien has some procedural rights.
However, in an exclusionary hearing the burden of proof is on the
alien, 21 and in some cases there is no right to appeal.2 2 The
Supreme Court has stated that, "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned. '23 In light of the possible severe consequences
to resident aliens, the need for clear guidelines for applying the
re-entry doctrine is evident.
"ENTRY" BEFORE

Fleuti

Originally the term "alien" in the immigration laws was interpreted to mean only alien immigrants. 24 The Supreme Court
changed this interpretation when it decided that a person was not
exempt from the immigration statutes merely because "of a previous
residence or domicile in this country. '25 The re-entry doctrine
was born in Lewis v. Frick26 when the Supreme Court held that
the "entry" requirement in the deportation statute was met regardless of any previous residence in this country.
18. Id. § 241 (a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4).

19. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
20. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1970) (right to counsel, cross examination, and the use of probative evidence).
21. Id. § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.

See In re Alarcon-Acosta, 14 I. & N.

Dec. - (I.D. 2244 1973).
22. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1970).
23. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
24. Moffit v. United States, 128 F. 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1904).
25. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914).
26. 233 U.S. 291 (1914).

When Congress first wrote the "entry" requirement into the immigration statutes, it probably was concerned with the original arrival
of an immigrant into the United States. 27 "Entry," nevertheless,
became a legal term separated from its common meaning. For example, an alien held at Ellis Island for twenty-one months was
deemed not to have entered the United States, and therefore was
not entitled to a deportation hearing. 28 In an earlier case, a oneday outing across the border created an "entry" for purposes of
29
finding grounds for deportation.
With only one exception,8" the early decisions applied the reentry doctrine literally. The Sixth Circuit in Zurbrick v. Borg3 '
deported an alien because he made an "entry" without a visa
when the train he was riding from Buffalo to Detroit passed
through Canada. Although applied reluctantly at times, 2 the reentry doctrine became crystallized and was given its clearest definition in United States ex rel Volpe v. Smith.33 In Volpe, the
Supreme Court noted that "entry" means "[a] ny coming of an alien
from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming
be the first or any subsequent one." 34
The first break in the strict interpretation of the re-entry rule
came in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth.35 Justice Hand, writing for the
Second Circuit on facts similar to Borg, decided that there was no
"entry" because the alien did not intend to leave the United States
when his train passed through Canada. The intent of the carrier
was not imputed to the alien who had no duty to inquire as to
the route.8 6
A second break in the Volpe rule came in Delgadillo v. Carmichael.37 In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether an alien who was forced to Cuba after his ship was tor27. See Gordon, When Does An Alien Enter the United States?, 9 FED.
B.J. 248, 249 (1948).
28. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953).
29. United States ex rel. Kowalenski v. Flynn, 17 F.2d 524 (N.D.N.Y.
1927).
30. United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F. Supp. 370, 373
(N.D.N.Y. 1932) (boy on school picnic was not a free agent).
31. 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931). See Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307 (9th
Cir. 1932).
32. See Zurbrick v. Woodhead, 90 F.2d 991, 992 (6th Cir. 1937); Jackson
v. Zurbrick, 59 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1932).
33. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
34. Id. at 425.
35. 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
36. Id. at 879.
37. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
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pedoed had made an "entry" when he returned to the United States.
The Court approved Di Pasquale's intent exception and created a
second voluntariness exception. This alien did not make an "entry"
because "the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act, put him on
foreign soil." 38 The voluntariness exception was followed with
little change from the Delgadiflo formula.8 9
In 1952, as part of a revision of the immigration statutes, Congress
codified the intent and voluntariness exceptions to the strict reentry rule. The statute contains the following definition of "entry":
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United
States . . . except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws
his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying
if...
possession was not intended or ... was not voluntary ....40

This statute was to become the basis for the Fleutidecision.

Rosenberg v. Fleuti
[W] e are in the never-never land of the Immigration and Nation41
ality Act, where plain words do not always mean what they say.
In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,42 the Supreme Court decided that the
statutory definition of "entry" did not mean what it obviously said.
The Supreme Court interpreted the intent exception in the statutory definition of "entry" to mean something totally different from
what either the Delgadillo court or Congress had considered as the
'43
relevant meaning of "entry.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service sought to deport
George Fleuti, a resident alien, on the grounds that as a homosexual
he was "afflicted with a psychopathic personality." "Entry" was
predicated on Fleuti's return from a trip of a few hours to Mexico.
Fleuti appealed the deportation order to the Ninth Circuit to chal38. Id. at 391.
39. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1948);
Yukio Chai v. Bonham, 165 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1947).
40. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(13) (1970).
41. Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney General of United States, 479 F.2d 820,
821 (9th Cir. 1973) (case did not deal with the re-entry doctrine).
42. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
43. See id. at 466 (Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White, JJ., dissenting).

lenge the constitutionality of the deportation provision. The appellate court agreed with Fleuti and found the statute unconstitutionally vague. 4" The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the validity of the statute; but rather than deal with the "psychopathic personality" provision, the Court decided to interpret the
intent exception to the "entry" definition. The Court construed the
intent exception to mean: [A]n intent to depart in a manner
which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's
permanent residence.45 In order to determine if the proper intent
was present, the Court furnished the following guidelines:
One major factor relevant to whether such an intent can be in-

ferred is, of course, the length of time the alien is absent. Another
is the purpose of the visit, for if the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish some object which is itself contrary to some
policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the
interruption of residence thereby occurring would be meaningful.
Still another is whether the alien has to procure any travel documents in order to make his trip, since the need to obtain such items
might well cause the alien to consider more fully the implications
involved in his leaving the country.., and other possible relevant
factors .... 46

The Court concluded that "[a]n innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders may not have
been 'intended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien
status. .... -47
Fleuti changed the obvious meaning of the statute, reversed prior
Supreme Court,48 lower federal court49 and Board of Immigration
Appeals decisions, 50 and abandoned traditional notions of intent
as applied to other areas of the law."1 If the rationale in Fleuti
is carefully examined, it is clear that the Court was not merely
interpreting Congressional intent. To arrive at this elaborate interpretation of intent, the Court was forced to build on a number of
questionable assumptions. Characterizing Di Pasquale and Delga-

44. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962).
45. 374 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added).
46. Id. (emphasis added). These will be referred to as the brevity, documents, and purpose factors.
47. Id.
48. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1958) (dicta).
49. Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949).
50. In re Bauer, 10 I. & N. Dec. 304, 328 (1963) (intent exception was
blurred with voluntariness).
51. See W. LA FAvE & A. SCOTT, CRnINAL LAw § 28 at 197 (1972); W.
PROSSEn, LAW OF TORTS § 8 at 31 (4th ed. 1971).

[VOL. 13: 192, 1975]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

dillo as a "substantial inroad"

52

into the re-entry doctrine was

the first such assumption. These cases arose from special facts and
only created a narrow exception to the re-entry rule53 which

otherwise remained in full force.5 4
The Court's second assumption was that Congress did not mean
to limit Di Pasquale and Delgadillo to their facts because the statu-

tory definition of "entry" was meant to reduce hardship. 55 In a
footnote, the Court impliedly recognized that the "entry" definition
was meant to codify these two decisions.5 6 Since the language in
the statute so closely resembles the Di Pasquale and Delgadillo
holdings, there is simply no indication that Congress intended a
sweeping change in the re-entry doctrine.
Having summarily rejected the Di Pasquale and Delgadillo holdings and the plain meaning of the statute's language, the Court assumed that "[t]he most basic guide to congressional intent as to
the reach of the exceptions is the eloquent language of Di Pasquale
and Delgadillo themselves ....

"57

The Court reasoned that be-

cause these two decisions sought to reduce the hardship caused by
the re-entry doctrine, Congress could not have meant to have the
58
statutory definition applied "woodenly."
Thus, by limiting the impact of the statute's history, the Supreme
Court concluded that it had a free hand in determining the meaning
of "intent." As demonstrated by the decision, this free hand was
used liberally. 59

Under the guise of statutory construction, the

Court radically expanded the intent exception to the re-entry doctrine. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has plenary power in determining the prerequisites for exclusion and deportation.6 0 However, the Court effectively curbed Congress'
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

374 U.S. at 454.
See United States v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1955).
See, e.g., Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949).
374 U.S. at 458.
Id. at 457 n.8. See Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir.

1974) which stated, "[t]he 1952 exception was a 'codifying' of several
cases decided shortly prior thereto."
57. 374 U.S. at 458.
58. Id. at 460.

59. The dissent argued the Court had "constructed" a doctrine when their

proper function was to "construe" statutes. Id. at 463. (Clark, Harlan,
Stewart, and White, JJ., dissenting.)
60. See id. at 461.

power by misconstruing the language Congress had selected. To
compound the lower courts' problem, the Court resorted to vague,
confusing language to cloak the misconstruction.
Fleuti
The confusing language in Fleuti has contributed to the present
uncertainty surrounding the re-entry doctrine. The Supreme Court
rested its decision on the intent exception, and yet included within
the holding factors unrelated to the concept of intent. Di Pasquale dealt with intent mainly in terms of knowledge. Fleuti abandoned a knowledge test but failed to create a meaningful substitute;
the brevity, purpose, and documents factors suggested by the Court
confuse the meaning of intent, rather than clarify the issue. The
artificial process suggested by the Court for inferring intent has
led to a number of interpretive problems. First, passages in Fleuti
seem to support a subjective test based on whether an alien wants
to relinquish his domicile in the United States."' Most decisions,
however, have ignored the subjective intent of the alien and have
primarily relied on objective factors independent of the alien's state
INRPRETING

of mind.

62

Another problem created by Fleuti is the determination of the
weight of each of the factors suggested by the decision. If the
excursion must be "innocent, causal, and brief,"'08 it is unclear whether these three factors are mandatory, or whether one can be
ignored in analyzing the factors necessary to imply intent. The essential difference is between "factors" and "prerequisites." The net
effect of this confusion has rendered the Fleuti doctrine too flexible.
By ignoring the express language in Fleuti and engaging in independent policy decisions, the Board of Immigration Appeals and the
courts have been able to choose different rationalizations to justify
04
different results in similar cases.
The first factor suggested by the Court for determining when
there is an intent to make a meaningfully interruptive departure
is the brevity of the visit. This factor is only important when there
is no misconduct associated with the "entry." Although one Board
decision implied that Fleuti only applied to a person who "merely
61. See, e.g., Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701, 703 (5th Cir. 1971);
Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 925 (1965).
62. See, e.g., Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1974); In re
Guimaraes, 10 I. &N. Dec. 529, 531 (1964).
63. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461 (1963).
64. Compare Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1974), with
Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir. 1972).
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stepped across the border," 65 the decisions have generally been
more lenient when the alien's condition or conduct at entry is not
the grounds for the deportation or exclusion, but is a prerequisite
for expulsion based on acts which occur before or after the "en0
try."
The courts take a different approach to the first factor when misconduct is associated with the trip. An alien who returned the
same day that he left made an "entry" because the trip itself was
to smuggle illegal aliens. 67 A four-day trip to voluntarily appear
before a Canadian court was too long. 68 In making the distinction
between longer innocent trips and shorter excursions which have
misconduct associated with the "entry," the decisions have, at times,
confused the brevity factor with the purpose factor. In In re
Wood the Board said:
We know of no instance in which it [the Fleuti doctrine] has been
extended to cover an alien who is charged with being excludable
or deportable because of an act or occurrence arising during or directly connected with the departure, absence or return.6 9
The Supreme Court in Fleuti wrote that if the "purpose of leaving the country" is to accomplish a proscribed objective the trip
will be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the resident alien's
status. 70 Because this is a shorter time span than an act "arising
during or directly connected with the departure, absence or return,"
the Wood standard places undue emphasis on the purpose factor.
In principle this standard may be defensible, but it ignores the express language in Fleuti. Fleuti was meant to prevent the hardship
of deportation or exclusion as the result of a short trip. Nevertheless, the central consideration has shifted from the first factor,
the length of the visit, to a determination of the nature of the trip.
Another factor mentioned by Fleuti was the need to "procure
travel documents." 71 This consideration is usually unimportant
65. In re Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551, 552 (1964), overruled on
other grounds, Matter of Quintanilla-Quintanilla, 11 I. & N. Dec. 432 (1965).

66. See Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.
1971) (three-week trip); In re Cardenas-Pinedo, 10 I. & N. Dec. 341 (1963)
(repeated short trips). Cf. United States v. Bowles, 331 F.2d 742, 750
(3d Cir. 1964).
67. In re Valdovinos, 14 I. & N. Dec. (I.D. 2228 1973).
68. In re Wood, 12 I. & N. Dec. 170 (1967).
69. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).

70. 374 U.S. at 462.
71. Id.

because a federal regulation allows a resident alien to use his Alien
Registration Receipt Card when returning from a trip of under a
year's length. 72 In most situations where Fleuti applies, travel
documents will not be needed because merely presenting the Alien
Registration Receipt Card to gain entry does not trigger the docu73
ments factor.
After stating the three factors, the Supreme Court in Fleuti
added that the necessary intent could be found by the use of "other
possibly relevant factors" to be identified by the lower courts. 74
The lower courts have added to the list of factors, but in so doing,
they have added to the confusion. For example, one additional factor which has been supplied may be the subjective desire of the alien
to retain his status as a resident of the United States. At first,
the Board was reluctant to even view this as a factor,", but now it
seems willing to consider whether the alien has a subjective intent
to remain domiciled in the United States.7 6 The real problem is
determining the weight of this factor. In Zimmerman v. Lehmann,17 the Seventh Circuit disposed of the case on a determination of the alien's subjective intent.
At the time of his 1952 visit to Canada, plaintiff had continuously

maintained his status as a resident alien for some thirty-nine years.
He was married to an American citizen, had three minor children
who were born in this country, all dependent on him for support,
and had a residence and business in Chicago. From the fact that he
took his family on a harmless, innocent vacation trip to Canada, it
would border on the absurd to ascribe to him an intention of impairing his status as a permanent resident of this country.78
72. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b) (1975), but note exceptions for visits to communist countries. See Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1079 n.25 (7th
Cir. 1974).
73. See In re Quintanilla-Quintanilla, 11 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (1965),
overruling, In re Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551, 553 (1964), which
stated that Fleuti dealt with whether an alien had "to obtain or present
documents upon his return to the United States."
One potential problem is determining what type of documents are needed
to meet the Fleuti test. In de Bildao-Bastidav. INS, 409 F.2d 820, 823 (9th
Cir. 1969), the Ninth Circuit stated that procuring a Spanish passport and
a Cuban visa in Mexico were sufficient acts to fulfill the documents factor.
Fleuti does not expressly state whether foreign documents obtained in a
foreign country are relevant to whether a meaningful departure has been
made. Arguably, since Fleuti speaks of an "intent to depart," procuring
foreign documents in a foreign country is irrelevant because this occurs
after the alien has left the country.
74. 374 U.S. at 462.
75. See In re Guimaraes, 10 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (1964).
76. In re Nakoi, 14 I. & N. Dec. (I.D. 2168 1972).
77. 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
78. Id. at 948-49.
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But in In re Nakoi, 79 the Board made it clear that the circumstances considered in Zimmerman were not conclusive. The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed, in dicta, its emphasis on subjective intent:
[A]nother group of relevant factors would undoubtedly center on
the effect of the uprooting caused by the deportation, that is, how
long the alien had been a permanent resident of the United States,
whether he had a wife and children living with him, whether he
owned a business establishment or a home or other real estate in
the United States, the nature of the environment to which he would
be deported, and his relation to this environment.8 0
Unfortunately this statement was not footnoted because the courts
have not followed this approach.
The lower courts have suggested numerous other factors. The
Board considered it relevant in one case that a person going to
Canada to answer criminal charges could not have known when
he would return. 81 The alien made an "entry" even though he
was only gone from the United States for a couple of days. The
Seventh Circuit has stated that a departure to get married would
82
be meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence.
A short visit will suffice as an "entry" if the legality of the alien's
presence in the United States is being questioned in a deportation
hearing when he leaves. 83 The trial court in Palatianv. INS considered "[t]he additional factors of his youth, of the absence of a
former criminal record, and of the absence of prior departures from
this country."8' 4 These considerations may be helpful in deter(I.D. 2168 1972).
79. 14 1. & N. Dec. 80. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1974). The
trial court in Palatian considered the fact that the defendant would be
deported to Bulgaria, a communist country. Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091,
1092 (9th Cir. 1974) (the Ninth Circuit paraphrasing the trial court). The
Ninth Circuit rejected this factor when it stated, "[h]owever much we
sympathize with his plight, the fact is that he foolishly brought it upon
himself." Id. at 1094.
81. In re Wood, 12 I. & N. Dec. 176, 177 (1967).
82. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1974).
83. In re Becerra-Miranda, 12 I. & N. Dec. 358 (1967). See In re
(I.D. 2168 1972); In re CaudilloAlarcon-Acosta, 14 I. & N. Dec. Villalobos, 11 I. &. N. Dec. 15 (1965), affd, 361 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966)
(although the alien did not fall within the statutory "entry" exception because he had to return to Mexico to answer legal process, the Board felt
compelled to distinguish Fleuti).
84. 502 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting, quoting

mining if it would be just to deport a resident alien, but they have
little to do with whether an alien has intended a meaningful departure from the United States. 5
All of the factors identified can be relevant. The problem is that
the courts have not developed an overall framework for applying
the Fleuti standard. Many decisions have turned on the purpose
factor, but this is the most ambiguous of all the relevant factors
and has caused a serious split in the circuits.
The Fleuti decision describes the purpose factor in this fashion:
Another [factor] is the purpose of the visit, for if the purpose of
leaving the country is to accomplish some object which is itself
contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws it would
appear that the interruption of residence thereby occurring would
properly be regarded as meaningful.8 6

The ambiguities are evident. What state of mind is required, 87 and
specifically, when does this state of mind have to exist?

Must the purpose be formed before leaving the country? Fleuti
contains contradictory language. At one point the Court speaks of
the "purpose of leaving the country."8 8 At another place the Court
declares "that an innocent, casual, and brief excursion" 89 is re-

quired to meet its test. The first quote implies that the purpose
is to be judged at departure; the second implies that the whole trip
is to be looked at to determine if it is innocent.
At first, the courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals assumed

that it made no difference when the purpose was formed.0 0

In

from the trial court's opinion). See Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073,
1079 n.26 (7th Cir. 1974).
85. The Ninth Circuit in Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1964)
suggested an approach which has been ignored by most courts when it
stated, "[t] he question is whether the interruption, viewed in balance with
its consequences, can be said to have been a significant one under the guides
laid down in Fleuti."
86. 374 U.S. at 462.
87. There may be a problem if the alien has the necessary intent when
he crosses the border but fails to complete a criminal act. Fleuti only requires that the "purpose" be against the policy of the immigration laws.
The Ninth Circuit has impliedly rejected the idea that only a proscribed
purpose is needed. See Palatian v. INS, 504 F.2d 1091, 1093 (1974), rejecting Yanez-Jaquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701, 704 (5th Cir. 1971) which seemed
to consider a purpose sufficient without an act.
88. 374 U.S. at 462.
89. Id. As will be shown, the decisions have not based their conclusions
on the "excursion" language, but have misread the first quote.
90. See In re Corral-Fragoso, 11 I. & N. Dec. 478 (1966) and Bufalino
v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973) (alien violated immigration laws on
his return to the United States).

[VOL. 13: 192, 1975]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Matter of Kolk,91 the Board modified the Fleuti language to make
it appear that the purpose was to be judged by the whole trip when
it stated that the pivotal question was, "[w]hether the alien by
leaving the United States 'accomplish[ed] some object which is
itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration
laws.' "92
93
In In re Vargas-Banuelos,
the problem of when the intent
has to be present was squarely confronted. A resident alien had
gone to Mexico to offer condolences to the family of a deceased
relative. While in Mexico, he accepted money to help some aliens
illegally enter the United States. The Board decided that the time
when the alien formed his intent was irrelevant. 4 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the Board's determination, noting that

[t]he lesson of Fleuti is that a brief departure from this country
should not give rise to grounds for deportation when the alien returns unless some element of the alien's state of mind at the time of
the departuresubjected him to the charge that he left the country
with the intention to interrupt his residential status. 95
The Ninth Circuit disagrees. In Palatianv. INS,96 the Ninth Cir9 7
cuit held that the time when the intent is formed is unimportant.
Ignoring the language in Fleuti,9 8 the court made its own determination that it would be irrational to draw a distinction based
on when the intent was formed.9 9 The Seventh Circuit, in indicating that it is ready to follow Palatian,stated
[i]t would perhaps be equally meaningful if the illegal purpose
was formed after departure but before return ....
Fleuti, however, does not limit the searching out of the purpose for leaving the
1
country to the illegal purpose ultimately formed. 00
91. 11I. & N. Dec. 103 (1965).
92. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
93. 13 1.& N. Dec. 810 (1971).
94. Id. at 814.
95. Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis
by the court).
96. 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 1093.
98. Compare Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963), which states
that the intent exception means "an intent to depart in a manner which
can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence," with Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1974) which
states "we do not think that the language in Fleuti which refers to 'an intent
to depart' is or should be controlling."
99. 502 F.2d at 1094.
100. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 1974).

The net result is a sharp split of authority on the meaning of
what seems to be the most important factor mentioned in Fleuti.
Finally, Fleuti creates the problem of determining the relationship between the "meaningful interruption" language and the purpose consideration. Most decisions have indicated that the purpose
factor is conclusive of the meaningful interruption test.10 1 However, the Fifth Circuit in Yanez-Jacquez v. INS10 2 stated that
at least in that case it did not consider the purpose factor control03
ling, and considered other elements.1
In summary, the brevity factor has become unimportant. The
documents factor is inapplicable in most cases because of federal
regulation, and the courts have failed to supply other meaningful
guidelines. By default, the purpose factor has become the single
most important consideration. Yet this consideration is the most
confused factor, and has produced a sharp split of authority. Neither Fleuti, nor the cases purportedly applying Fleuti, have articulated meaningful guidelines for the critical determination of
whether there is an "entry."
PROPosALs FOR REFORM
A possible solution to this confused area of immigration law
would be to abandon the re-entry doctrine completely. 0 4 If an
alien is to be deported because of reprehensible conduct while in
the United States, his expulsion should not rest on the tenuous
thread of "entry." Rather than subjecting resident aliens who have
made a re-entry to the unexpected hazards of "entry," it would be
better to deport all aliens who act contrary to the immigration laws.
The same sanction should be placed on all aliens that Congress
thinks are undesirable, regardless of any prior departure from the
United States. No resident alien should be subject to exclusion
after his original entry into the United States.
If the re-entry doctrine is to remain part of the immigration laws,
it should be more clearly defined. One way of doing this would
be to base a determination of "entry" on either totally objective
or totally subjective factors. An objective test would at least provide uniformity. Under the Volpe rule, the resident alien knew
that he made an "entry" whenever he crossed the border. A subjec101. See, e.g., In 'eScherbank, 10 1. & N. Dec. 522 (1964).
102. 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. Id. at 703.

104. See Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Laws: Proposals for Re-

form, 56 CoLul.

L. R v. 309, 328-29 (1956).
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tive test has proved useful in the area of discretionary relief from
deportation.10 5 Under this theory, the determination of "entry"
would turn on whether the alien subjectively intended to abandon
his domicile in the United States. 10 6 It is reasonable to treat a
resident alien as an immigrant if he has intended a permanent departure from this country. The subjective intent to leave this
country could be implied if the alien has severed personal ties in the
United States. This subjective approach could cause administrative
problems and make a determination of "entry" more difficult, but
considering the severe consequences to the resident alien involved,
these inconveniences do not seem too great.
If the "nebulous"'0 7 Fleuti standard is to remain the test, the
controversy surrounding the purpose factor should be resolved by
making'its boundaries clear. The stakes are too high for the alien,
and the effort required of Congress or the Supreme Court is too
minimal to justify further delay. If neither the Congress nor the
Supreme Court decides to act, the actual language in Fleuti, which
is the only binding authority in this area of immigration law, should
be more closely followed by the lower courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals when making the critical determination of
"entry."

MATr

W HRRON

105. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970). See
Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151, 153 n.3 (9th Cir. 1966); Wadman v.
INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
106. The Seventh Circuit may already consider this relevant. In LozanoGiron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1974), this court considered it
relevant that "[t]he petitioner introduced no evidence as to property or
employment ties within the United States .. ."

107. 1 GORDON, supra note 11, § 4.6 (c) (Supp. 1975).

